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Abstract
Players are arranged on a regular lattice and coded with a specific strat-
egy for a pre-defined game. Each player sums their payoffs from playing
the game with each of their neighbors, and then adopts the strategy of
the most successful player in the neighborhood. Dynamics are thus deter-
mined by the relative ranks of all possible payoff sums.
Linear sums of payoffs, however, generate only a small proportion of
all possible rankings. Allowing for any ranking (motivated by Conway’s
Game of Life) creates a rich array of dynamics.
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1 Games on a Grid
Games on a grid have been extensively studied (see [1][2][3][4][5]) with interest-
ing dynamics and the surprising result that strictly dominated strategies, like
cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma, can persist in a spatial environment.
The simplest idea is that you start with and underlying 2× 2 symmetric game
coop defect
coop aa bc
defect cb
d
d
and consider an N ×M grid of players. Using wrap-around to make it a torus
is convenient to avoid boundary effects.
Dynamics proceed by repeating two steps:
STEP 1) Each player is initially programmed to play either coop or defect, plays
the game with each of their 8 neighbors, and sums their own payoffs.
STEP 2) Each player compares their sum to each of their 8 neighbors. If any
neighbor has a higher sum using a different strategy, the player will adopt the
strategy of this more successful neighbor.
For generic payoffs, there will be no ties between players using different strate-
gies. For non-generic 2x2 games, one can adopt the convention of preferring to
keep or to change one’s strategy. Introducing a stochastic element to break ties
is another solution, but will not be considered here.
Hexagonal grids, up-down-left-right neighborhoods, games on a regular graphs,
and games with more than one strategy are easily considered with the same
analysis as the following.
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2 Analysis
Suppose each player has N neighbors, has strategies numbered 0 or 1, and the
underlying game is:
0 1
0 a b
1 c d
In STEP 1, each player counts the number of neighbors with strategy 1, obtain-
ing a count 0 ≤ k ≤ N . The player’s own strategy is either 1 or 0, so there are
2(N + 1) possible net payoffs:
Payoff for player of type 0: (N − k)a+ kb
Payoff for player of type 1: (N − k)c+ kd
Generically, these will be 2(N+1) distinct values (i.e. if a, b, c, d are real numbers
selected from any continuous probability distribution, there is a zero probability
that two of these expressions will be equal), and hence a player’s payoff uniquely
determines their strategy.
In STEP 2, a player will compare their net payoff to that of their neighbors.
The only thing that matters is the relative ranks of the net payoffs.
For example, consider the standard rectangular grid with eight neighbors and
the prisoner’s dilemma:
0 (coop) 1 (defect)
0 (coop) 1.0 0.1
1 (defect) 1.9 0.3
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The possible payoffs are:
Number of neighbors of type 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Player type 0: 8.0 7.1 6.2 5.3 4.4 3.5 2.6 1.7 0.8
Player type 1: 15.2 13.6 12.0 10.4 8.8 7.2 5.6 4.0 2.4
The resulting rankings create a rank matrix:
Number of neighbors of type 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Player type 0: 13 11 10 8 7 5 4 2 1
Player type 1: 18 17 16 15 14 12 9 6 3
The ranking determines the game dynamics; once the ranking matrix is deter-
mined, the game matrix and net payoffs can be dispensed with.
Note that the net payoff depends linearly on the count of neighbors, and hence
both rows of the rank matrix are monotone.
3 Nonlinearity
The most well know cellular automata is Conway’s Game of Life, whose dy-
namics also depend on a count of neighbors. However the dependence is not
monotone: too many or too few occupied neighbors leads to the demise of an
occupied cell.
The core idea of nonlinear spatial games is to consider all possible rank matrices,
regardless of monotonicity or even any underlying game. That is, allow the
2×(N+1) rank matrix to contain any arrangement of the ranks 1, 2, . . . , 2(N+1).
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For example, the rank mtx:
Number of neighbors of type 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Player type 0: 12 8 16 14 9 3 6 1 10
Player type 1: 2 11 18 17 5 13 4 15 7
leads to interesting dynamics:
with a movie available here:
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/37273687/octo 02.mp4
Any nonlinear spatial game can be formulated as a cellular automata, where the
future of any particular cell is a function of that cell and its neighborhood. Due
to the two-step nature of spatial games, this involves neighbors of neighbors. For
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a rectangular grid this would be a 5× 5 square. The set of all possible ranking
matrices for a rectangular grid is 18!, which would be a minuscule proportion
of of the possible cellular automata. Since the nonlinear spatial games rely on
counts, the cellular automata are already invariant under symmetry.
Exploring the dynamics of randomly generated rank matrices reveals a remark-
able proportion that generate visually interesting dynamics.
An additional example:
Number of neighbors of type 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Player type 0: 9 18 4 13 5 1 8 7 14
Player type 1: 3 12 10 17 11 6 16 15 2
with movie:
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/37273687/cellz 02.mp4
A hexagonal example:
Number of neighbors of type 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Player type 0: 4 13 1 5 10 2 7
Player type 1: 9 14 12 11 6 8 3
with movie:
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/37273687/turq 07.mp4
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